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Traditional Christian Belief and Belief
in the Supernatural: Diverging Trends
in the Netherlands Between 1979 and 2005?
NAN DIRK DE GRAAF
MANFRED TE GROTENHUIS
Is there an ongoing decline in religious beliefs in the Netherlands? Using cross-sectional data from 1979 up
to 2005, we focus on traditional Christian faith and belief in the supernatural; the literature suggests that they
undergo diverging trends. We first describe these trends using the Social and Cultural Developments in the
Netherlands surveys covering the 1979–2005 period. Explanations for the trends are formulated and tested using
OLS regression models and a counterfactional simulation technique. Our findings indicate that during the 1979–
2005 period both traditional Christian faith and belief in the supernatural declined, although the latter at a slower
rate. Since church membership rates are continuously declining as well, belonging and believing still go hand in
hand in the Netherlands. The most important explanation for both the decline in traditional Christian faith and
the decline in belief in the supernatural is the slow but continuous replacement of older religious affiliated cohorts
with younger nonaffiliated cohorts.
INTRODUCTION
Kepel (1994) identified an increasing attention to religion in the mid 1970s. One could then
notice an increase in the influence of political Islam, a new e´lan in the Roman Catholic Church
under leadership of Johannes Paulus II, and the expansion of fundamental Protestant groups in
the United States and in South America. Interestingly, at the same time in Europe (Halman and
Draulans 2006) and especially in the Netherlands there was abundant evidence for secularization:
declining rates of church attendance, a rise in religious disaffiliation, and the closing of churches,
as well as the declining authority of churches.
In the Netherlands, religion plays an increasingly marginal role and secularization at the
individual level has been documented in detail (Becker and De Wit 2000; De Graaf, Need, and
Ultee 2000, 2004; Need and De Graaf 1994; Te Grotenhuis 1999). Research has shown that
both church attendance and religious affiliation declined considerably through the end of the past
century. Nowadays, more than 75 percent of the Dutch population attends church less than once
a month while less than 50 percent are religiously affiliated. However, this does not necessarily
imply a decline in religious beliefs, since it is argued that a decline in church attendance and
religious disaffiliation might be caused by the lack of competing churches that are therefore
unable to satisfy the diverse religious needs of people (Finke and Stark 1988; Iannaccone 1997;
Stark 1997; Stark and Iannaccone 1994).1
What might have happened in the Netherlands is an increase in the relative number of people
who are less (or not–) religiously affiliated but who still uphold religious beliefs. That a decline
in religious involvement does not necessarily imply a decline in belief has also been argued by
Dutch scholars such as Dekker (1994) and Van Tillo (1994). Similarly, Davie (1994) argues that
there is “believing without belonging” and this could mean that the proportion of believers does
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not change, but religious involvement may decrease. If we assume in accordance with supply side
theory that religious demand is stable or that there is a universal form of religious commitment
(Stark 1997:8), given the decrease in religious affiliation in the Netherlands, we should find an
increasing gap between belonging and believing (Davie 1994, 2002).
The crucial assumption of rational choice theory or, rather, the supply side version of the
rational choice theory,2 is that people have a constant demand with respect to religious prod-
ucts. For instance, one of Stark’s hypotheses holds: “In pursuit of rewards, humans will seek
to exchange with a god or gods” (1999:270). He states: “Regardless of power, persons, and
groups will tend to accept religious compensators for rewards that do not exist in this life.
Here I noted that in some regards everyone is deprived and everyone has a motive for being
religious—that since everyone faces death, doctrines of an afterlife appeal to all. We could call
this the universal form of religious commitment” (Stark 1997:8). Stark and Finke (2002) state
that the advantage of postulating stable preferences is that one is not tempted to explain every
shift in religious life by a corresponding shift in public preferences. They therefore assume
that “religious preferences are quite stable and form distinctive and durable niches” (2002:33)
“because religion is the only plausible source of certain rewards for which there is general
and inexhaustible demand” (Stark and Finke 2000:85). One could doubt whether the percent-
age of the population who really think religion is a plausible source for rewards is constant
over time, but supply side theory predicts that when multiple religious providers emerge in
an unregulated market, involvement in religious organizations will increase. This theory can
therefore explain fluctuations in religious involvement and at the same time assume stable
preferences.
According to Davie (2002), despite a decline in orthodox Christian beliefs people remain
interested in the supernatural (cf. Glendinning 2006). Apparently, Davie (2002) also assumes,
like Stark and Finke (2002), a stable demand. The implication of Davie’s arguments is that
this should show up in a stable level of belief in the supernatural. As for the Netherlands it
seems also important to distinguish traditional Christian belief (i.e., belief in God) and belief in
the supernatural, since research indicates that traditional Christian belief has declined (Becker,
De Hart, and Mens 2006). Possibly, the stable religious demand is not so much reflected by a
stable traditional belief in God, but by a stable belief in the supernatural. We therefore are going
one step further by investigating whether believing and belonging might go different ways if we
focus on belief in the supernatural instead of traditional Christian belief.
In this study, we will investigate the trends in both traditional Christian belief and belief
in the supernatural with data spanning 26 years, using repeated cross-sectional surveys from
the “Social and Cultural Developments in the Netherlands” project (SOCON). These surveys
were done in 1979, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. Another aim of this article is to explain
the observed trends in religious beliefs. For this purpose, we will use theoretical models and a
simulation technique, which will enable us to answer to what extent the trends are a consequence
of compositional changes in the Dutch population and, in particular, the replacement of older
cohorts with younger cohorts.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
Trends in Religious Beliefs: Expectations
In The Sacred Canopy, Berger (1967) stated that religion is no longer prominent in daily
life. When interpreting phenomena that occur in this world, individuals use religion less and less
as a reference. Berger coined this form of secularization subjective secularization. According to
Berger, objective secularization is the declining influence of the churches in daily life. In this
article, we will focus on subjective secularization, despite the fact that scholars such as Stark and
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Finke (2000) claim that secularization theory is empirically not supported and even Berger does
not support his earlier theoretical work anymore. The reason is that we simply cannot ignore
the abundant empirical findings that the process of secularization has been going on for several
decades in the Netherlands (Need and De Graaf 1996; Te Grotenhuis 1999; cf. Becker, De Hart,
and Mens 2006), but also in other European countries such as Britain (Crockett and Voas 2006;
De Graaf and Need 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2005).
To investigate subjective secularization we will use various religious beliefs or conceptions
that are connected to the religious interpretation of the world as well as to one’s own existence. First
of all, we will investigate the trend in traditional Christian belief in the Netherlands. Traditional
Christian belief assumes explicitly the existence of a personal God. This conception is, not
surprisingly, strongly related to church membership (Felling, Peters, and Schreuder 1991), which
is also in decline (Felling, Peters, and Scheepers 2000). One of the advantages of our cross-
sectional data set is the possibility of investigating whether the declining trend of traditional
Christian belief encountered a bottom effect in recent years. If the Dutch indeed increasingly
construct their own private conception of belief and if it is indeed true that the demand for
religion does not change over time (Stark 1997; Stark and Bainbridge 1985, 1987), then we
should find no decline in nontraditional religious conceptions. Hence, our two trend hypotheses
are that traditional Christian belief is in decline (Hypothesis 1a) while belief in the supernatural
is more or less stable (Hypothesis 1b). These hypotheses will be tested using a representative
sample of all Dutch excluding those with a non-Christian affiliation. The hypotheses will also be
tested for Catholics, liberal and orthodox Protestants, former church members, and nonmembers
separately.3
Trends in Religious Beliefs: Explanations
For an explanation of why people vary in their religious beliefs, we make use of the theoretical
distinction Need and De Graaf (1994, 1996) have made for church leaving. Beyond supply side
approaches, two theories provide explanations for religious behavior and attitudes. The first is
a theory of rationalization (also known as the modernization theory), which originates from the
work of Weber (1920). The second is a theory of social integration, which is rooted in the work
of Durkheim (1897). An overview of these theories can be found in De Graaf, Need, and Ultee
(2004).4
A classical explanation for secularization is the process of rationalization. The basic ar-
gument is that technologically advanced societies, building on scientific-based knowledge,
(in-)directly undermine the foundations of religious faith. A well-known indicator for the process
of rationalization is educational attainment (De Graaf and Luijkx 1992). We will investigate to
what extent religious belief is affected by (a) one’s own education and (b) the general educational
level of one’s environment. With respect to individual educational attainment we expect that a
higher level of education will lead to a weakening of traditional Christian belief (Hypothesis 2a).
If, however, religious demand is stable and people remain interested in the supernatural (Davie
2002), we expect the influence of education on belief in the supernatural to be weak, if not absent
(Hypothesis 2b).
Besides individual educational attainment, the average educational level of a society, as
a contextual indicator of rationalization, may negatively affect the extent to which one has a
world view in which God plays an active role (Te Grotenhuis 1999). The influence of contextual
characteristics was already suggested by Tschannen (1991) and has successfully been tested
several times on Dutch data (Need and De Graaf 1994; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001).
An important question in explaining trends is whether differences in religious belief are caused
by differences in rationalization trends during one’s upbringing. There is considerably more
rationalization since World War II in the Netherlands and since it increased especially beginning
588 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
in the 1960s, we expect the following cohort effect: a higher level of rationalization during one’s
early socialization is associated with weaker traditional Christian beliefs (Hypothesis 3a). With
regard to belief in the supernatural we expect the influence of rationalization to be weak or absent
(Hypothesis 3b), since religious demand is assumed to be constant.
The theory of social integration contains a very general hypothesis about norm-regulated
behavior: the more people are integrated into a social group, the more they will comply with
any norm of that group (Stark 2004). With regard to traditional Christian belief, people will
believe more strongly, the more they are integrated into a religious group. Research demonstrates
that in the Netherlands, the religious denomination one is affiliated with is strongly correlated
with one’s traditional Christian belief. The highly integrated orthodox Protestants (i.e., those
with the highest church attendance rates) endorse traditional Christian belief more strongly than
Catholics and the liberal Protestants (Felling, Peters and Schreuder 1991) who are less integrated.
Furthermore, those who left the church are even less integrated in a religious community and are
less traditionally religious than those who are a member of a church. Finally, those who have not
been raised as Christians (i.e., nonmembers) are the least integrated and have only a very weak
traditional Christian belief.
Because of these well-known differences in traditional Christian belief between church mem-
bers, former members, and nonmembers, we will investigate whether the impact of rationalization
is equally strong for all denominations. One might expect that the orthodox Protestants, because
of their well-known strong integration in their religious community, will be less sensitive to
processes of rationalization than Catholics and liberal Protestants who are less integrated. There-
fore, we hypothesize that the extent to which rationalization (measured by individual educational
attainment and the average educational level in society during one’s upbringing) will negatively
affect traditional Christian belief and the effect will be weaker for orthodox Protestants compared
to Catholics and liberal Protestants (Hypothesis 4).
Trends in Religious Belief Explained by Compositional Changes in a Population
Our hypotheses provide an explanation for trends in religious belief. Trends such as the
decline in religious belief might (partly) be caused by compositional changes within the Dutch
population. In the Netherlands, there has been a longitudinal shift toward an increasing number of
highly educated individuals. If Hypothesis 2a is corroborated, that is, higher educated individuals
uphold traditional Christian belief less strongly compared to the lower educated, then the shift
toward more a highly educated population will inevitably lead to a decline in traditional Christian
religious belief in the Netherlands. With the help of simulation models we will investigate to
what extent compositional changes within the Dutch population explain trends in both traditional
Christian belief and belief in the supernatural.
METHOD
The data that are used are from the SOCON surveys. These multiple cross-sectional surveys
were held in 1979 (n = 1,003), 1985 (n = 3,003), 1990 (n = 2,384), 1995 (n = 2,019), 2000 (n =
1,008), and 2005 (n = 1,375). All surveys are representative of the Dutch population (excluding
those with a non-Christian affiliation) aged 18–70 with regard to age, marital status, and gender.
For details about the design, nonresponse, and how representative the surveys are we refer to
Eisinga et al. (1992, 1999, 2002, 2008). From this longitudinal data set we selected the following
variables that were based on identical questions in all surveys.
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Measurement
Dependent Variables
For the measurement of traditional Christian belief three statements were used:
1. There is a God who concerns Himself with every individual personally.
2. There is a God who wants to be our God.
3. For me, life has only meaning because of the existence of a God.
For the measurement of belief in the supernatural we use two statements:
4. There is something like a supernatural force that controls life.
5. I believe in the existence of a Supreme Being.
Respondents were given six response categories: agree entirely, agree, don’t agree/don’t
disagree, don’t agree, don’t agree at all, never thought about. Respondents who choose this last
category (between 3 percent and 5 percent) were left out of the analysis. With the help of factor
analysis the two sets of dependent variables were reduced to two interval variables with a mean of
zero and identical standard deviations (95).5 The correlation between the two scales was 0.67.
Individual Characteristics
Educational attainment was measured using seven categories: (1) primary education; (2)
lower vocational; (3) lower secondary; (4) secondary vocational; (5) O levels/A levels; (6) higher
vocational; and (7) university. Denomination was measured using a two-stage question. Respon-
dents were first asked whether they considered themselves a church member and if yes, they
were asked to which denomination they were affiliated. Denomination was coded into Catholic,
orthodox Protestant, and liberal Protestant. We expect individuals who have never been affiliated
with a religious denomination to differ from people who have been affiliated. Therefore, we
distinguish between nonchurch members and former members using a question about former
church membership. Finally, an age variable was constructed using both year of survey and year
of birth. Because preliminary analyses showed severe multicollinearity between the original age
variable and average educational attainment of the population at age 15, the age variable was
recoded. All respondents older than 45 were coded as 45. This recoding is based on the empirical
finding that religious beliefs tend to level off strongly from age 45 onward (Te Grotenhuis, De
Graaf, and Peters 1997). After recoding, we found the estimates obtained in Tables 1–4 were
not affected by collinearity.
Contextual Characteristics
In order to measure the cohort or socialization effect of rationalization, we use the average
educational level of all graduates who entered the labor market in the province where the respon-
dent lived at the time he or she was 15 years of age. The data originate from Central Bureau
of Statistics (CBS) data sets, the 1966 Census, the labor count data set 1977 and 1985, and the
survey of the labor force 1992.
Analyses
To test our hypotheses we use linear regression models. In the first model, the trends in
religious beliefs for all five groups (i.e., Catholics, liberal Protestants, orthodox Protestants,
former church members, and nonmembers) were estimated. Because we expected bottom effects
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TABLE 1
OLS-ESTIMATES (STANDARD ERRORS) FROM LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSES
ON TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN BELIEF (MODEL 1)
All Liberal Orthodox Former Church
Groups Catholics Protestants Protestants Members Nonmembers
Independent variable
Intercepta 20.11 58.07 81.15 117.03 −26.97 −50.77
(1.80) (2.55) (5.17) (3.56) (4.85) (4.42)
Year (lin) −1.91 −1.90 −0.82
(0.13) (0.19) (0.26)
Year (log) −7.55 −7.80 −5.36
(2.22) (1.94) (1.71)
N 9,358 2,419 1,029 871 2,329 2,710
aIntercept denotes average score in 1979.
for former church members and nonmembers, we present log linear parameters instead of linear
parameters if the former provided a better fit of the data. In a second model, education, average
level of education, and age were added in order to explain the trends.
FINDINGS
Traditional Christian Belief
For the sample as a whole (all groups taken together), we found a substantial linear decline
in traditional Christian belief (Table 1) as indicated by the negative sign of the year parameter
(−1.91). This clearly supports Hypothesis 1a. If we consider each group separately we notice,
as expected, that in 1979 orthodox Protestants had the highest average score on traditional
Christian belief (117.03; cf. Table 1), while former church members and nonmembers had the
lowest average scores (−26.97 and –50.77). Liberal Protestants and Catholics were to be found
in between these extremes (81.15 and 58.07, respectively). Despite these vast differences, in all
groups there has been a decline. This decline appears to be approximately linear among Catholics
(–1.90) and orthodox Protestants (−0.82). We interpret the stronger decline among the Catholics
as a confirmation of the integration theory, since Catholics attend church less often than orthodox
Protestants, consequently are less integrated, and therefore more likely to become less religious.
The estimated decline for liberal Protestants, former members, and nonmembers is curvilinear:
traditional Christian belief declines but the rate gradually slows down over time. This is probably
due to a bottom effect, especially for former members and nonmembers, because their traditional
Christian belief was already relatively weak in 1979.
Next, we included education, average educational level, and age (as a control variable) in the
model. We test to what extent these variables have a effect on religious beliefs and as a consequence
may explain the estimated trends (cf. Table 2). As hypothesized, a higher educational level tends
to weaken traditional Christian belief (Hypothesis 2a). However, this negative effect differs
across groups. The effect is strongest among former members and nonmembers (–9.17 and –9.46,
respectively), less strong among orthodox Protestants (−4.40) and liberal Protestants (–3.80), and
lowest (and nonsignificant) among Catholics (−0.72). These findings do not support Hypothesis 4;
the effect of education was expected to be stronger among Catholics and liberal Protestants
compared to orthodox Protestants. In accordance with Hypothesis 3a, average educational level,
as an indicator of rationalization, has a negative effect on traditional Christian belief; again the
effect differs by group. According to Hypothesis 4 we expected the effect of average level of
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TABLE 2
OLS-ESTIMATES (STANDARD ERRORS) FROM LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSES
ON TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN BELIEF (MODEL 2)
Liberal Orthodox Former Church
Catholic Protestants Protestants Members Nonmembers
Independent variables
Intercepta 40.18 77.67 108.3 −33.35 −58.43
(3.58) (5.27) (5.02) (4.17) (5.70)
Year (lin) −0.90 −0.15
(0.27) (0.38)ns
Year (log) −6.30 −3.30 −1.47
(2.86) (2.60)ns (2.39)ns
Education −0.72 −3.80 −4.40 −9.17 −9.46
(0.83)ns (1.27) (1.14) (0.87) (0.80)
Average educational level −43.24 −1.03 −17.68 −11.56 −2.29
(6.49) (9.72)ns (9.84) (7.33)ns (6.40)ns
Ageb −0.19 0.00 −0.60 0.12 −0.11
(0.38)ns (0.56)ns (0.52)ns (0.39)ns (0.32)ns
N 2,419 1,029 871 2,329 2,710
aIntercept denotes average score in 1979 (education, average educational level, and age are grand mean
centered). ns = nonsignificant deviation from 0; α = 5 percent (two-tailed test (t = 1.96) for age, one-tailed
test (t = 1.645) for year, education, and average educational level).
bAge has been recoded (i.e., 45 and older are coded “45”).
education to be stronger among Catholics and liberal Protestants than among orthodox Protestants.
This expectation only holds for the Catholic-orthodox Protestant contrast. The effect is –43.24
for Catholics and −17.68 for orthodox Protestants, which is significantly different (tested with
equality constraint in a structural equation model, α = 0.05). The effect of average level of
education is not significantly present for the liberal Protestants. Among former members and
nonmembers the effect is also moderate and nonsignificant. Finally, the age effect turns out to be
nonsignificant for all groups.
After the inclusion of education, average level of education, and age the estimated trends are
substantially reduced for all groups (cf. the difference in the year parameter in Table 2 compared
to Table 1). Note that for orthodox Protestants, former members, and nonmembers the trend
becomes nonsignificant.
Belief in the Supernatural
We estimated the trends in belief in the supernatural as well. The first column of Table 3
shows that for the whole sample there is a significant and substantial linear decline (−1.51),
although somewhat less compared to traditional Christian belief in God. This finding does not
support Hypothesis 1b predicting no significant change in belief in the supernatural. Table 3 also
shows that in 1979, Catholics had the highest average score on belief in the supernatural (56.18),
closely followed by liberal Protestants (53.32) and orthodox Protestants (48.87). Former church
members and nonmembers had the lowest average scores (−18.37 and −37.32, respectively).
Unexpectedly, the adherence to belief in the supernatural is falling among all groups, with the
exception of the orthodox Protestants. This means that in general Hypothesis 1b, stating that
belief in the supernatural is stable, is not supported by the empirical results. Among former
members and nonmembers the decline is not particular strong (−0.57 and −0.78). However, in
592 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
TABLE 3
OLS-ESTIMATES (STANDARD ERRORS) FROM LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSES
ON BELIEF IN SUPERNATURAL (MODEL 1)
All Liberal Orthodox Former Church
Groups Catholics Protestants Protestants Members Nonmembers
Independent variable
Intercepta 17.04 56.18 53.32 48.87 −18.37 −37.32
(1.81) (2.73) (5.98) (5.81) (3.63) (3.35)
Year (lin) −1.51 −1.63 0.22 −0.57 −0.78
(0.13) (0.20) (0.42)ns (0.25) (0.21)
Year (log) −4.69
(2.56)
N 9,603 2,478 1,024 867 2,435 2,799
aIntercept denotes average score in 1979.
ns = nonsignificant deviation from zero; α = 5 percent (one-tailed, t = 1.645).
TABLE 4
OLS-ESTIMATES (STANDARD ERRORS) FROM LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSES
ON BELIEF IN SUPERNATURAL (MODEL 2)
Liberal Orthodox Former Church
Catholics Protestants Protestants Members Nonmembers
Independent variables
Intercepta 40.28 55.62 42.41 −23.36 −39.40
(3.83) (8.02) (6.12) (4.91) (4.57)
Year (lin) −0.77 0.72 0.06 −0.51
(0.28) (0.46)ns (0.39)ns (0.35)ns
Year (log) −6.34
(3.31)
Education 3.32 −0.80 −6.62 −4.35 −5.53
(0.88) (1.47)ns (1.86) (1.01) (0.94)
Average educational level −46.29 7.64 −6.74 −24.87 −2.80
(6.91) (11.21)ns (15.92)ns (9.50) (8.72)ns
Agec −0.07 1.23 −0.67 −0.03 0.13
(0.40)ns (0.65)b (0.84)ns (0.51)ns (0.44)ns
N 2,478 1,024 867 2,435 2,799
Note: aIntercept denotes average score in 1979 (education, average educational level, and age are grand
mean centered). ns = nonsignificant deviation from 0; α = 5 percent (two-tailed test (t = 1.96) for age,
one-tailed test (t = 1.645) for year, education, and average educational level).
bNonsignificant at α = 5 percent, but significant at α = 10 percent (two-tailed, t = 1.645).
cAge has been recoded (i.e., 45 and older are coded “45”).
1979 belief in the supernatural was already very weak among former members and nonmem-
bers. The weak decline among former members and nonmembers is probably due to a bottom
effect.
Again, we included education, average educational level, and age in the model (cf. Table 4)
to measure their effect and to estimate the impact on the trends reported in Table 3. Among
Protestants, former members, and nonmembers a higher educational level tends to weaken be-
lief in the supernatural. This contradicts Hypothesis 2b. Exceptions are the positive effect of
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education among Catholics (3.32) and the nonsignificant effect among liberal Protestants (−0.80).
The effect of average educational level reaches a significant level only among Catholics (−46.29)
and among former church members (−24.87). Finally, the age effect is nonsignificant for all
groups except for liberal Protestants, in which case the effect is positive and significant (α =
0.10). Although the variables added to the model on average do not have very substan-
tial effects, the original (significant) trends are reduced for Catholics, former members, and
nonmembers.
Simulations
The focus of this article is not so much on the effects of education, average level of education,
and age but on the extent to which these variables can explain the trends reported in Tables 1 and
3. We already mentioned that the trends are less strong after inclusion of education, average level
of education, and age. This reduction may occur for three reasons. First, in the 1979–2005 period,
the relative number of individuals with a high level of education rose sharply and this resulted
in lower levels of traditional Christian belief as well as lower levels of belief in the supernatural.
This is so because individual educational achievement is negatively related to both beliefs. This
first effect is a composition effect due to changes in the distribution of education at the individual
level.
The second explanation for the reduction is the replacement of older cohorts by younger
cohorts who experienced a different type of socialization. The number of older people who
grew up while the average level of education of their co-citizens was low decreases over the
1979–2005 period, while at the same time the number of younger people who grew up while the
average level of education of their co-citizens was high increased. Since the average educational
level is negatively related to belief in God and belief in the supernatural, the level of religious
beliefs would decline over time. This second effect is a composition effect due to changes in the
macro-context in which people live.
The third explanation for the reduction is the process of religious disaffiliation. In the
1979–2005 period, the relative number of Catholics and Protestants dropped considerably. Since
there are differences in the level of religious beliefs between affiliated and nonaffiliated people,
religious disaffiliation therefore obviously has to be partly responsible for the downward trend.
This expectation runs counter to some scholars who argue that belonging and believing are
increasingly different phenomena and religious disaffiliation cannot explain much of the trends,
especially the trend in belief in the supernatural.
Age turned out to be inversely, but nonsignificantly, related to religious belief. Furthermore,
the average age did not increase much in the Netherlands between 1979 and 2005, which is also
reflected in our data set. Therefore, we expect little or no impact of age.
To test the relative impact of average educational level, individual educational achievement,
and disaffiliation we performed a counterfactual simulation analysis known as “purging” (Clogg
1978; Te Grotenhuis, Eisinga, and Scheepers 2004).6 In this analysis, we simulated the distribu-
tion of individual educational achievement from 1979 to be constant for subsequent years (i.e.,
we imposed the 1979 distribution of individual education upon the data from 1985 to 2005) and
calculated the average score on both traditional Christian belief and belief in the supernatural.
By doing so, we answer the question: “What would be the trend in religious beliefs, if individual
educational levels in the Netherlands did not change after 1979?” To assess the contextual impact
of average educational level during childhood we set the average educational distributions to be
constant as well. With this simulation we are able to answer the question: “What would have
happened to the trend in religious beliefs if there would be no contextual change of rational-
ization?” In other words we simulated no inflow of individuals who have been socialized while
the average educational level was high, and no outflow of individuals who have been social-
ized while average educational level was much lower in the 1979–2005 periods. Finally, it is of
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TABLE 5
ORIGINAL TREND AND SIMULATED LINEAR TRENDS IN RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
Dependent Variable:
Traditional Christian Belief in
Belief Supernatural
Trend Reduction Trend Reduction
Original trend (cf. Table 1/3) −1.91 −1.51
Simulated trend while average
educational level is held
constant on 1979 level
−1.69 11% −1.21 20%
Simulated trend while individual
educational level is held
constant on 1979 level
−1.73 9% −1.43 6%
Simulated trend while relative
size of all five groups is held
constant on 1979 level
−1.09 43% −0.83 45%
Simulated trend while average
educational level, individual
educational level, and relative
size of all five groups are held
constant on 1979 level
−0.51 73% −0.36 76%
importance to investigate to what extent the decrease of the relative number of Catholics and
Protestants, and the increase of the relative number of former members and nonmembers, af-
fected the downward trends. So, we simulated no religious disaffiliation since 1979 to answer the
question: “What would be the trend in religious beliefs if the relative number of Catholics, Protes-
tants, former members, and nonmembers did not change after 1979?” The results are reported in
Table 5.
The original average trend in traditional Christian belief is −1.91. The simulated trend if the
average educational level would not have changed amounts to −1.69, which implies a reduction
of 11 percent. The simulated trend is −1.73, assuming the individual educational level to be
constant since 1979, implying a reduction of 9 percent over the original trend. These reductions
are somewhat different for belief in the supernatural, that is, 20 percent and 6 percent, respectively.
Next, we simulated a trend assuming no changes in the number of Catholics, orthodox Protestants,
liberal Protestants, former church members, and nonmembers since 1979. In this simulation
43 percent of the trend in traditional Christian belief and 45 percent of the trend in belief in the
supernatural is interpreted. In a final simulation, with no compositional change at all, 73 percent
of the trend in traditional Christian belief and 76 percent of the trend in belief in the supernatural
is explained.
In the Netherlands almost everyone who is a nonmember or a former member will remain so
over the lifecycle (Need and De Graaf 1994, 1996). Furthermore, among older cohorts the risk
of disaffiliation seems much lower compared to people from more recent (younger) cohorts (Te
Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001). Our counterfactual simulations indicate that the replacement of
older cohorts (with a relatively large number of affiliated people) by younger cohorts (consisting
of large numbers of nonmembers and former members) is mainly responsible for the downward
trend in traditional Christian belief and belief in the supernatural in the Netherlands.
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CONCLUSIONS
With the six repeated cross-sectional surveys in the Netherlands we had the opportunity to
investigate religious changes over a period of 26 years using identical measures. More tests for
other nations with a similar time perspective are required in order to know whether our results
generally apply. Of course, these surveys have their weaknesses. An important one is that we
do not make any claim concerning the approximately 900,000 Muslims (about 6 percent of the
population) who live in the Netherlands. To investigate the extent to which Muslims are influenced
by the modern Dutch context would provide a unique opportunity to put secularization theory
to the test (De Graaf 2002). Phalet and Haker (2004) concluded using Dutch data that Muslims
are indeed influenced by rationalization. Although their data cover a shorter time span than in
this study, they concluded that the Muslim identity is still very strong, but young Muslims are
on average clearly less strict with respect to their religious duties than older Muslims. Phalet and
Haker realized that it is difficult to disentangle lifecycle- and cohort-effects properly in their data,
but they claim that the most plausible interpretation of their data is that cohorteffects are present.
Their conclusion is in accordance with our findings on Christian religions.
Many scholars in the sociology of religion field agree that traditional indicators like church
attendance and church membership are in decline throughout Europe, but suspect people in-
creasingly retain private conceptions of religious belief. In other words, a process of religious
individualization has taken place. Consequently, people still believe or have conceptions that are
somehow connected to a religious interpretation of the world. In this study, we tested whether
this is indeed the case. For this purpose, we distinguished between traditional Christian belief
and belief in the supernatural. First of all, for both traditional Christian belief and belief in the
supernatural we find in general a significant decline over the 1979–2005 period, although the
decline in belief in God is clearly greater than the decline in belief in the supernatural. Since
traditional Christian belief and belief in the supernatural decline at different rates, and effects
of educational achievement, age, and average education differ. Traditional Christian belief and
belief in the supernatural are related but are distinct. Interestingly, the correlation between the two
religious beliefs is highest among Catholics, former church members, and nonmembers (0.61,
0.66, and 0.67, respectively) while lower among liberal Protestants (0.49) and especially among
orthodox Protestants (0.23). Apparently, the latter consider both beliefs to be much more different
than the former. Interestingly, the same pattern holds for conservative and evangelical Protestants
in the United States. So counterintuitive as it may seem, because of the growing number of former
members and nonmembers in the Netherlands the distinction between traditional Christian belief
and belief in the supernatural most likely will probably become less strong in the future.
Among the Catholics and orthodox Protestants, we found a roughly linear decline in tradi-
tional Christian belief between 1979 and 2005. This decline is strongest among the Catholics.
Among the liberal Protestants, former church members, and nonmembers, we noticed a nonlinear
decline in traditional Christian belief suggesting a bottom effect among former members and
nonmembers. For belief in the supernatural, we find a significant nonlinear decline among the
liberal Protestants and a significant linear decline among Catholics, former members, and non-
members. These results suggest that the process of secularization is still going on albeit in some
cases at a somewhat slower rate.7
Our results clearly show that traditional Christian belief and belief in the supernatural is in
decline. Since the number of church members is declining as well, believing and belonging go
hand in hand. This indicates that there is not much believing without belonging, although the
somewhat slower decline in believing in the supernatural suggests somewhat diverging trends,
that is, an increasing gap with traditional Christian faith.
What will the near future look like when it comes to religion in the Netherlands? Our findings
suggest that the decline of religious beliefs will continue due to cohort replacement, albeit at a
slower rate due to bottom effects. Crockett and Voas (2006) found a decline of religious belief
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in Britain, which was also caused by cohort replacement. Interestingly, both in the Netherlands
and in Britain there are no signs that due to an aging effect people become more religious.
Life course data revealed that nonmembers and former members in the Netherlands will remain
so during their whole lifecycle (Need and De Graaf 1994, 1996; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers
2001). We therefore conclude that in the Netherlands for the years to come, a continuing “silent
secularization revolution” in which both religious belief and religious affiliation decline is the
most likely longitudinal trend and not a large-scale religious revival.
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NOTES
1. Lechner (1996) is of the opinion that after the depillarization in the Netherlands, the Dutch became real consumers in a
religious economy. In other words, individuals should have become more influenced by the religious market. However,
the structure of that religious market, according to Lechner, hardly changed in the decades after the depillarization.
2. The label “supply side theory” is a phrase introduced by Finke and Iannaccone (1993) in order to make a distinction
with the traditional approach, which interpreted religious developments mainly as a change in the demand for religion.
Scholars quite often assume that the supply side theory is the only rational choice theory of religion (Halman and
Draulans 2006). There are, however, other versions that do not make the assumption about a stable demand. The
work of Sherkat and Wilson (1995) and the recent work of Stolz (2006) are examples. Furthermore, although we
are using the label “rational choice” it is of interest to note that Stark and Finke in their later work clearly object to
being identified as rational choice theorists because, as they judge it, it bears the danger of being identified as “crypto
economists unable to deal with the subtleties of religious realities” (2000:41).
3. In the Netherlands, there are various Protestant denominations that can be grouped into orthodox Protestants and
liberal Protestants (officially labeled as “Rereformed” Protestants and “Reformed” Protestants). The former interpret
the Bible’s content more literally and are much more conservative than the latter. This schism in the Dutch Protestant
church occurred around 1834 and only recently (2004) liberal and orthodox Protestant churches were officially
reunited, although the differences in attitudes and conduct are still pregnant.
4. The recently adjusted secularization theory by Norris and Inglehart (2005) in which existential security is the driving
force behind secularization has not been used in this article, since in the 1979–2005 period the security level guaranteed
by the welfare state did not change substantially in the Netherlands. Furthermore, if there was a change it was directed
downward: the welfare state became too expensive and consequently people became less protected by social security
measures in the past decade. Interestingly, and in contrast to Norris and Inglehart’s prediction, secularization is still
going on.
5. We conducted a factor analysis with two factors (rotation: direct oblimin) to test whether both sets of variables cluster
into different dimensions. This indeed turned out to be the case (see table below), although the dimensions are highly
correlated (correlation 0.67). The reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) are 0.89 for traditional Christian belief
and 0.79 for belief in the supernatural. Metric scales were constructed on the basis of a regression technique.
Traditional Belief in the
Item Christian belief Supernatural
1. There is a God who concerns Himself with
every individual personally
0.851 0.052
2. There is a God who wants to be our God 0.850 0.077
3. For me, life has only meaning because of the
existence of a God
0.815 −0.059
4. There is something like a supernatural force
that controls life
−0.057 0.826
5. I believe in the existence of a Supreme Being 0.189 0.699
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6. We also run simulations to measure the impact of age but, as expected, the reduction was close to zero. Because the age
parameters were almost all nonsignificant, any reduction of the trend by age is highly questionable. For that reason,
we left these results out of this article.
7. In the international literature there is a lively discussion on secularization. For example, Stark and Finke (2000) are
of the opinion that secularization is simply not going on, especially if one would consider a time range of several
centuries. However, we cannot ignore the strong trends in the Netherlands and other Western countries over the past
decades (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2005).
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